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Introduction
Most major policy successes and failures can be captured in simple statistics. In
this case, that statistic is 6,000 worker deaths from work related accidents in the United
States during the year 2000.1 While a simple statistic such as this one does not tell the
whole story, it does point to an important social issue. It is this statistic and my resulting
understanding of the social issues at stake that have led me on a research journey that
began as an investigation of the criminal aspects of Occupational Safety and Health Act
violations in the United States and evolved into comparative study of occupational safety
and health enforcement in the United States, Canada and Sweden.
Given that this paper began with my interest in the problems inherent in the
United States occupationalsafety and health system and will en d with my
recommendations for changing that system, it is necessary to take a moment to
understand the dire situation that the system faces. During my initial foray into the area of
occupational safety and health, the breadth and depth of the problem became clear. While
death rates are high, enforcement capabilities are low: “OSHA actually has fewer staff
today than it did in 1980. The workforce and the number of workplaces have grown, but
the agency’s resources have not”.2 Furthermore, even when OSHA does inspect facilities
where there have been work-related deaths, “in 93 percent of those cases, OSHA declined
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to seek prosecution”.3 From a total of 2,197 cases inspected by OSHA involving workrelated deaths, studied by the same New York Times report that provided the last piece of
data, “employers faced $106 million in civil OSHA fines and jail sentences totaling less
than 30 years”.4 These dismal statistics provide the backdrop against which the following
analysis must be understood.
One would expect thatwith data like this, the United States would fall well
behind the rest of the industrial world in the effectivenessof its occupational safety and
health protection. Unfortunately, straight statistics, such as these, can be somewhat
deceptive without sustained quantitative and/or qualitative analysis of the explanations
underlying them
. This premise is born out by a simple overview of death rates per
100,000 workers in some major developed countries in 2002: Sweden; 1.4, Austria; 4.5,
Canada; 7.2, United States 4.0.5 These basic numbers combined with even the most
rudimentary understanding of the differing styles of governance exhibited in each of
these geopolitical entities, suggest that there is something to be gained by a more
sustained investigation of the determinants of the current occupational health and safety
situation in the United States. That is, while Canada’s relatively poor performance in
these measures conflicts with the general perception of its desire to extend protections to
its workers, a greater understanding of these issues might suggest a cogent explanation.
Beyond creating an interesting puzzle for social scientists to solve, the problem
presented by the safety and health system in the United States is particularly important
for a variety of reasons. Most obviously, anytime a large number of individuals are dying
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in what seems to be a systematic and related way, society must respond. The necessity of
this response can be seen in movements related to the prevention of drunk driving, the
equal provision of healthcare, and the abolition of the death penalty, amongst others.
While not everyone will agree with the mechanisms or goals of each of these movements,
it is still easy to recognize that the motivating force behind raising each issue is some
sense of right and wrong.
These moral ideas about right and wrong constitute values. Values are not some
abstract concept devoid of daily meaning. Values shape daily decisions because they
color every choice a person makes. Even the etymology of the word legal points to the
fundamental importance of these values in the legal system:
The word legal has as its root the Latin lex, which meant law in a fairly concrete
sense ... The word lex did not include the more abstract, ethical dimension of law ...
The larger meaning was contained in the Latin jus from which we derive the word
justice. This is not an insignificant semantic distinction: the word of law, whether
statutory or judge-made, is a subcategory of the underlying social motives and beliefs
from which it is born. It is the technical embodiment of attempts to order society
according to a consensus of ideals6
The importance of Williams’ statement here cannot be under estimated. The fundamental
precept in any inquiry into a law and its outcomes is to always try to identify the
particular values underpinning the policy decision. The clearest way to perceive this is to
look for places where there are no clear statutory commands and the court has room to
maneuver. It is in these cases that the values of the deciders become important.
Policymakers and jurists will often rely on their values and assumptions so heavily in
these cases that they will not even make a reasoned argument for having them, but will
assert them continually and without derivation.
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The realm of labor relations and occupational safety and health practice in
particular demonstrates clearly the relationship between values and policy. The welfare
state in general developed out of clear decision on the part of the cultural community in
each nation, and in the United States specifically, to value the rights of workers to certain
basic guarantees: “The welfare state itself is a socio-political construct, which, since it
involves insurance and redistribution, could not exist without the support of strong
normative arguments and moral convictions”.7 Furthermore, the vague language with
which many laws have been written in each of these countries have allowed the law’s
interpreters, particularly jurists, to use values to determine policy.
In all cases, these “prevailing ideas about ethics, humanity, law, private property,
economics and the nature of the employer-worker relationship not only condition the
thinking of these decision-makers, but also provide them with the ultimate standards for
judgment”.8 This process therefore works in two directions: values shape legislation and
at the same time values shape the interpretation of that legislation.
Although issues surrounding workplace safety and health have not always been at
the forefront of domestic political debates, the United States, like most other liberal
democracies in the twentieth century, has attempted to regulate this complex area.
Regulating the workplace in general, and safety and health specifically, has elicited a
number of different approaches and results around the world. Attempting to provide an
adequate regulatory structure for the workplace requires deftly balancing a number of
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competing concerns. Two particularly important interests in the workplace are those of
management and labor. Policy choices, such as those in the area of safety and health that
attempt to balance these interests, often generate strong debates both domestically as well
as internationally. These debates are not objective or neutral since the interests that are
being balanced correspond directly to the differing values of participants in these debates.
In order to negotiate these policy debates that are influenced by values, it is often
instructive to compare the policy choices of a variety of countries at different points on
the social spectrum in order to evaluate the usefulness of approaches to managing one
issue.
In this case, examining the United States, a country that generally favors
management interests, Canada, a country that generally favors a hands-off policy, and
Sweden, a country that generally favors labor interests, provides a background for
comparing occupational safety and health policies. Although the debate surrounding
workplace safety and health is expansive, an important part of any discussion is
determining the effect of policies on individual workers. After all, any policy centering
on workplace safety and health must at least address the goal of improving the day-to-day
workplace conditions for an individual worker. Thatconcern i s of primary importance in
evaluating a country’s approach to agency regulation, worker participation in determining
the workplace environment, and a worker’s right to refuse unsafe work.
Against a background of the importance of moral concerns, international
comparison and policy formulation, I will explore the enforcement of occupational safety
and health systems in the United States, Canada and Sweden to investigate safety and
health regulation, worker participation, and the right of employees to refuse unsafe work.
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I will initially provide a descriptive analysis of the particular safety and health policies
along with the historical background necessary to understand these choices. Along these
lines, Chapter 1 will be devoted to a review of the development of the welfare state in the
United States, Canada and Sweden. Chapter 2 will then breakdown the specifics of the
health and safety regulatory systems in each country. Chapter 3 will continue the
exploration of the specifics of safety and health policy in each country by focusing on
worker participation in each country’s system. In Chapter 4, dedicated to a purely
descriptive analysis, I will discuss the right to refuse unsafe work in each of the three
countries. The conclusion of this paper will be devoted to a more subjective argument
about the relationship between values and occupational safety and health policy. In this
light, the conclusion will explicate the necessity of a human rights view of workers rights
and will then recommend specific policy changes for the United States.
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Chapter 1: The Historical Development of the Welfare State in the United States,
Canada and Sweden
While the general story surrounding the development of a welfare state may be
familiar to most, the specifics of the development of each welfare state play a large role
in shaping the policy choices made by that particular welfare state. That is, viewing the
emergence of a welfare state as merely the response of a government to the mass poverty
and potential unrest that results from industrialization belies the complexity and
importance of this particular historical process. It is not, however, the goal of this
analysis to provide an overly detailed or particularly nuanced discussion of the
development of the welfare state in the United States, Canada, and Sweden. Instead, a
discussion of the general evolution of welfare policy in each nation will supply important
background in understanding the particular safety and health system choices made by
each country as well as the corresponding values embraced by each country.
Furthermore, while history helps to explain how current occupational safety and health
policy came to be, it is also important for determining the array of options for safety and
health policy in the future.
The true birth of the modern welfare state began at the beginning of the twentieth
century, as the world was about to tackle some of its most awesome challenges yet:
At the dawn of this century, perhaps more than ever before, conscious choices
about how to organize society were being required. And these choices were being
posed as the old faiths in traditional authority were losing their grip on the
masses. The domestic turmoil of the years leading up to World War I, the
uncertainties of the interwar years – allthis is a rich and complex story in every
country.9
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The policy choices made by each developing welfare state in the twentieth century were
varied, but they included many that directly impacted the day-to-day existence of the
emerging working class. The occupational safety and health policy choices made in each
nation closely mirrored the development of other welfare policies. The emerging
traditions embraced in each country helped to determine the range of options available to
policymakers. In this chapter, the development of the welfare state in each country will
be described by paying particular attention to choices that affected the growing working
class population.
United States
Upon landing in the New World, America’s first settlers were often confronted
with difficult situations. The overall strain of colonization made poverty a regular
occurrence in colonial America. True to their Old World heritage, colonial assemblies
adopted “poor laws” that were modeled on Elizabethan legislation.10 By the end of the
1600s, poor relief was being put to full use with growing cities such as Boston hiring fulltime administrators.11 This system of poor relief sustained itself through the American
Revolution and to the eve of the Civil War with only minor modification addressing such
issues as the appropriateness of workhouses and the need for the relief of the able-bodied
poor.12 The Civil War and the resulting relief needed for the injured, wounded and
disabled pushed aside such debates about means-testing for poor relief and instead caused
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individuals and states throughout the country to mobilize around both public and private
relief.13
As the post- civil war expansion of poor relief began to recede in favor of private
charity, the need expressed by the increasing number of people impoverished by
industrialization strained the system at the beginning of the twentieth century.14 However,
these drastic increases in poverty caused by the “complex problems associated with rapid
industrialization, a market economy, urbanization and immigration” gave reformers a
renewed incentive to call for greater public assistance “since poverty was a social rather
than individual matter”.15 The resulting increases in public expenditure on poor relief and
the upsurge in the economy through the 1920s provided for America’s poor up to the eve
of the Great Depression in 1929.
The stock market crash of 1929 and the resulting depression were devastating for
America’s poor relief system. A system that relied on public expenditure for the most
destitute and private charity for many of those capable of employment was overwhelmed
by the millions of people impoverished overnight. Many of the country’s private relief
agencies evaporated, only putting more pressure on the unprepared public system.16
Unfortunately, states and localities were slow to respond. It was almost two years before
New York State, under the leadership of Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt, provided its
citizens with the first package of depression era unemployment relief.17
Even as the social reformers of the 1920s backed off their calls for personal
reform, President Hoover stuck to his belief that public aid would create personal
13
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dependency and hence could not be supported, even during the country’s darkest
economic hour.18 Fortunately, when Roosevelt was elected President in 1932, he brought
with him the system of unemployment relief that had been successful in New York State
and copied by over twenty states.19 The resulting New Deal programs and agencies,
modeled after those of New York, provided the backbone of America’s economic and
social stabilization heading into World War II.
The New Deal clearly defined the beginning of the United States’ role as a
modern welfare state. For the first time, as the nation lurched forward into the 1940s, the
nature of public social assistance had changed from providing only limited relief to the
economically disadvantaged to a welfare state that guaranteed protection to the aged,
blind, crippled, and mentally challenged, amongst others.20 However, just as America
seemed on the verge of institutionalizing a culture of social welfare, the economic
prosperity of World War II and the years that followed brought renewed calls for the
reduction in social spending on welfare in favor of private social reform. One of the
clearest examples of this was state by state administrative reform which significantly
curtailed the support provided by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
a mainstay of the social welfare adopted during the New Deal.21 The market raised real
living standards, fostered greater labor market quality and provided a good degree of
income security.22

18

Id. at 277.
See Id. at 279-281.
20
Id. at 304.
21
See Id. at 306-309.
22
John Myles, When Markets Fail: Social Welfare in Canada and the United States, in Welfare States in
Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies 120 (Gosta Esping-Andersen ed., 1996).
19

11
This same trend in social spending reduction accounted for much of the failure of
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, as well President Nixon’s election and the rightward
turn in American politics it represented.23 While the nation suffered though the socially
and economically turbulent 1960s and 1970s, the welfare state moved along mostly
unchanged. It was not until Ronald Reagan was elected that drastic changes would come
again. Reagan, interpreting his victory as a social mandate, attempted to dismantle what
was left of the welfare state in whatever ways possible.24 In conjunction with a sustained
effort at deregulation and union busting, Reagan cut spending for “A.F.D.C., child care,
school lunch and other nutrition programs, food stamps, subsidized housing, energy
assistance, family planning, public and mental health service, alcohol and drug abuse
counseling, legal aid, the Jobs Corps, and the like”.25
While President George H.W. Bush maintained much of the status quo in regard
to the social spending levels pursued by Reagan, his eventual successor, Bill Clinton, a
New Democrat, did change the social welfare landscape. While Clinton, a fiscal
conservative, was willing to increase expenditures on such programs as healthcare, in the
end, the most prominent program on which he could corral the necessary majorities in
Congress was welfare reform.26 Despite being a Democrat, Clinton led the welfare to
work campaign and in the end abolished AFDC entirely, while instituting a new system,
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), that
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placed greater power in the hands of the states while for the first time instituting limits on
the longevity of welfare received.27
The specifics of the genesis of labor related policy can now be understood against
the background of the overall development of the welfare state in United States. While it
is not necessary or desirable here to redraft an entire history of labor relations in the
United States, a few pieces of basic background regarding the federal government’s
relationship to labor market will be necessary. One of the first instances of sustained
federal government intervention in the labor market occurred during World War I. As the
United States became increasingly involved in European affairs, the War Labor Policies
Board, created in 1918, regulated the labor market by freezing wages and guaranteeing
military contractors profit via a cost-plus system.28 Next, as part of the New Deal, the
federal government passed the Wagner Act in 1935. The Act, also known as the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), established a number of democratic labor rights, most
importantly the right to collective bargaining.29 Along those lines, the Taft-Hartley Act
passed in 1947, as the economy was on an upswing, limited some of the rights guaranteed
by the NLRA but maintained its “declaration that it was the policy of the United States to
encourage the practice of collective bargaining”.30 The modification of the NLRA in
1947 was part of the very tail end of the New Deal social legislation and in some ways set
the stage for the pendulum to swing in the other direction in the second half of the
twentieth century.
27
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As the country emerged from the Great Depression with its social policy
significantly changed, the federal government had cemented its role in the labor market.
This role was further reinforced during World War II, when similarly to World War I, the
federal government dealt with labor shortages through the controls of the National War
Labor Board.31 Federal government intervention in the labor market during the years after
World War II up until the 1980s was characterized by limited intervention, deferring
instead to the economic security provided by an expanding economy.32
In 1970, the United States passed the centerpiece of its effort to regulate
workplace safety and health: The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). The
original intent of the act was to provide “so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions”.33 The wording of the act
also puts the burden on the employer to provide employees a safe workplace. However,
the Act does give most of the power to the federal government to regulate the day-to-day
conditions of work and does not rely on individual workplaces to adapt the Act to
different situations. Along with many other pieces of legislation that were designed to
favor workers, the 1980s focus on deregulation and management autonomy resulted in a
lack of enforcement of the standards set forth in OSHA.
In the early 1990s, “even the whiff of ‘labor law reform’ was sufficient to doom
proposals for the reform of the Occupational Safety and Health Act that, among other
things, would have mandated the creation of workplace safety and health committees at
most workplaces”.34 This failure of the federal government to play a stronger role in the
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labor market in the United States as well as in Canada “is now regarded as the reason for
the comparative success of both national economies in generating jobs”.35 As a result of
this praise which has been heaped upon the limited labor market intervention in the
United States, labor law has been almost totally neglected:
The core of American labor law has been essentially sealed off … both from
democratic revision and renewal and from local experimentation and innovation.
The basic statutory language, and many of the intermediate level principles and
procedures through which the essentials of self organization and collective
bargaining are put into practice, have been nearly frozen, or ossified, for over fifty
years36
It is against this backdrop that any discussion of labor related policy in the United States
must take place. The clear shift from a country that responded to a great economic crisis
with strong welfare institutions to a country that prides itself on limited market
intervention and thus static labor laws, demonstrates the shifting values embodied by the
particular policy choices made in the United States over the last century. In order deossify labor law in the United States, such values must be understood as a result of a
particular national history.
Canada
While Canadian welfare state development and policy has differed from the
United States, there are important similarities which help to explain why Canada’s labor
market institutions are often seen as at least partially paralleling those in the United
States. In a similar fashion to their United States counterparts, early Canadian settlers
modeled their initial poor relief system on those of the Old World.37 The first break with
the trajectory of American poor relief came in 1867 when Canada established its first
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constitutional document. This document set the precedent for much of Canadian social
welfare policyby giving most of the power in this area to its provinces and not to the
federal government.38 From 1867 until the early twentieth century, Canada underwent a
gradual change from relying on private charity and minimal public poor relief targeted at
only the poorest of the poor, to a system where provincial governments began to
intervene in the public sphere with increasing regularity.39
As in the United States, the industrialization of cities forced Canada to deal with
the constant possibility of mass unemployment as well as the breakdown of traditional
notions of personal responsibility.40 By the beginning of the 1900s, provincial
governments had instituted free public education, public grants to private charity
organizations, and the basis for a social security system.41 However, the attempt to keep
charity in the private realm was overwhelmed by market insecurities that dominated the
Canadian labor market from 1910 through the beginnings of the Great Depression. These
uncertainties caused provinces to take more responsibility for their urban poor by
buttressing already existing government provisions for poor relief.42 Suchspending
increases were augmented by a new series of programs including, workers’
compensation, mothers’ pensions, minimum wage laws and old age pensions.43
As Canadian provinces were spending more money on poor relief, the Canadian
federal government also became more involved in the nation’s social landscape. Most of
the initial programs instituted by the federal government came as a response to World
38
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War I. This began with the introduction of veterans’ benefits and continued with the
provision of assistance to relatives of the deceased. After the Depression and World War
II, the Canadian government and the generation it represented realized that everyone was
always at risk and hence a stronger welfare state was required.44 This change in attitude
caused a shift of power from localities to provinces in the financing and administration of
social welfare programs.45
The programs created bythis outlook were primarily constructed around social
rights guaranteed to citizens. The most prominent and symbolic program that
demonstrated this trend was universal healthcare. Universal healthcare was further
supplemented by increasing social regulation and programs such as old age insurance.46
Sustaining many of these new programs required federal government financing of
provisional programs in a way that moved the federal government closer to operating a
cohesive welfare state.47 This shift to federal government involvement was the basis for
the development of what is known as the Canadian Social Union.48 Almost as soon at the
post World War II social welfare state was installed, the economic crisis of the late 1970s
and early 1980s put pressure on Canadian governments to retreat from their social goals,
especially in the area of full employment.49 This pressure caused some reduction in the
citizen based guarantees associated with the Canadian welfare state, especially in the
labor market, although it did not cause Canada to shift away from its provision of such
central elements as healthcare.
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The development and decline of Canadian government intervention in the labor
market responded to many of the same social trends present in the development of the
overall Canadian welfare state. Even as early as the beginning of the twentieth century,
Canadian provinces began to inspect factories in order to prevent the spread of industrial
diseases.50 Also, the post World War II increase in social welfare programs included
significant labor market regulation. Many of these programs were established in the years
following World War II but were continually tinkered with through the 1980s. The most
obvious examples of these were Unemployment Insurance and Pension Plans.51 These
more general labor market programs were complemented by targeted regulations such as
minimum wage laws and initial health and safety regulations.52
In contrast to the United States, Canada has much more decentralized approach to
regulating the workplace. Instead of focusing most of the power in the hands of the
Federal Government, Canadian provinces have the ability to develop their own safety and
health systems with only general instructions from federal legislation. The provinces have
provided a fairly consistent set of standards that are patterned after the safety and health
legislation passed in Saskatchewan in 1972. One of the important pieces of federal
legislation that overlaps with provincial regulation is the Canada Labour Code of 1985.
The intricate safety and health system produced by this strongly federal welfare state will
be further discussed in the following chapters.
At the end of the 1970s, the pressure that was placed on the Canadian government
to respond flexibly to the demands of the business sector caused a loosening of traditional
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Canadian goals of full employment and robust unemployment insurance.53 Despite the
changes this pressure has engendered, “rising labour market inequality in Canada has
been offset by social transfers”, even though there has been a “sharp rise in demand for
transfers”.54 This however marks the fact that Canada has moved away form its initial
citizenship design of social welfare to one much more focused on income transfers.55 In
this way, although Canada has undergone a similar path of welfare state development to
the United States, since the Canadian commitment to furnishing certain guarantees based
upon citizenship has mitigated the impact of recent pressure to limit its provision of
income inequality and social rights.
Sweden
Sweden, an often heralded example of the efficacy of a strong welfare state,
developed very differently from the United States and Canada. Sweden is generally seen
as the natural inheritor of the welfare state mantle initially attributed to Bismarck’s
unemployment insurance policies in Germany.56 While this initial impression has some
validity, the story of the Swedish welfare state must be primarily understood in terms of
its commensurate development with Swedish social democracy.57 The Swedish welfare
state went beyond the citizenship model embraced in Canada: “The goal is equality of
income … and equality of access to social services of the highest standard”.58 This
commitment to ultimate income equality would determine much of Sweden’s
contemporary welfare state policy.
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While often described as the most advanced welfare state in the world, Sweden
was not always a shining star. During the nineteenth century, Sweden was a relatively
poor country without any economic power.59 Given the country’s decentralized
agricultural economy, without large landholders, there had been limited public funded
“poor relief” aimed at maintaining work discipline before the country’s industrialization
in the late 1800s.60 However, although Sweden was not wealthy, it never experienced the
agricultural feudalism of most of Europe, and it traditionally valued education, as
evidenced by early and continued high literacy rates throughout the country.61
Sweden’s industrialization did not begin until the relatively late date of the 1870s,
while much of its workforce had already left for the prosperity of North America.62
Despite its slow move toward economic modernization, Sweden was one of the first
nations to respond to Germany’s social insurance system, passing its first social insurance
bill as early as 1884.63 This initially bill, along with its many corollaries that would be
passed through the 1910s, “paralleled the democratic breakthrough, the extraparliamentary struggle for universal and equal suffrage as well as the growth of social or
popular mass movements”.64 The most important of these changes was the mass popular
movements which culminated in the establishment of a political party advocating Social
Democracy in 1889.65 The expansion of the basic goals of social democracy, such as
political equality and worker democracy, dominated the Swedish political landscape
through the 1920s.
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However, just as the rest of the world felt the fall-out from the Great Depression
in 1929, so too did Sweden. This left Sweden at a cross-roads: small adjustments to the
status quo would no longer be accepted. Both the right and the left in Sweden demanded
radical changes.66 The beginnings of the modern Swedish welfare state are most clearly
traced to an important intellectual move in the 1930s, “which ushered in the active labor
market policy together with social insurance, a wide sphere of ‘socialized consumption’
…, important agricultural subsidies and regulations …. and international high tax
levels”.67 During World War II, Sweden developed national boards aimed at coordinating
the wartime response on the part of labor and management. These boards provided the
basis for post-war institutional cooperation at a national level.68
Similarly to the United States and Canada, Sweden used the relative peace of the
post World War II world to develop rapidly. For Sweden this time period allowed it to
institutionalize its position as a dominant industrial power: “Swedish Industry underwent
major technical and economic development after the Second World War”.69 The rapid
industrial growth combined with high taxation rates left over from the war years
combined to allow the Swedish government to direct more funds toward social programs
and redistribution. These changes began with housing and employment programs and the
extension of entitlement and improvement programs to all levels of society by the early
1970s.70 Swedish expenditures on government programs stayed at levels similar to initial
post-war levels, until the 1970s when they “increased more rapidly than in other OECD
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countries”.71 However, when the world economy lurched during the oil shocks of the
1970s, Sweden’s social welfare mix proved vulnerable. While the country refused to
change its structural commitment to its social democratic tradition, it was forced to
devalue its currency three times during the late 1970s.72
The early 1990s were a turbulent time in Sweden’s political and economic
history. Sweden’s failure to alter its economic structure during the 1970s caused its
economy to overheat in the early 1990s, which consequently forced drastic cutbacks in
public expenditures.73 Sweden had maintained a standard of living commensurate with
the best in the developed world up until 1989, but by 1993 Sweden’s standard of living
began to fall below countries such as Italy and Austria.74 The most important success of
the Swedish welfare state during the middle of the twentieth century was its ability to
almost entirely eliminate poverty.75 Thus, the social provisions of the Swedish welfare
state that developed as a result of the emergence of social democracy in Sweden had a
profound effect on the daily fabric of the country.
The history of labor market policies in Sweden was also primarily determined by
the rise of social democracy in Sweden. Corresponding to the beginnings of social
democracy in the late 1800s, the union movement became a force to be reckoned with in
Swedish economic and political life at the end of the nineteenth century.76 As early as the
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1920s, Sweden had instituted the eight-hour day.77 Also, the active labor market policy of
the 1930s created state employment agencies, state subsidies of unions, housing
programs, and maternity benefits, amongst other programs.78 After World War II, the
favorable economic conditions encouraged an institutionalized wage bargaining system
throughout the country and also caused an overwhelming increase in private and public
sector unionization.79
The economic expansion after World War II increased the economic standard of
living but also caused a decline in working conditions throughout Swedish industry: “new
hazardous materials were introduced in many industries, the work was accelerated, and
many jobs that had previously required professional workers lost status due to
automation”.80 This led to a period of industrial strife during the 1960s where strikes and
lockouts became more prevalent than they had been for 40 years.81 As a response to this
industrial unrest, much of Swedish labor law was reformed in the 1970s, including
occupational safety and health law.82 The Work Environment Act of 1977 sets a broad
framework for regulation, which divides responsibilities for workplace safety and health
in general terms. The legislation itself, along with the agency it authorizes, creates broad
health and safety standards. However, instead of specifying a laundry list of punishments
for potential violations, the Act encourages mutual resolution between employers and
employees. In this way, the Swedish approach emphasizes the enforcement of a set of
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necessary health and safety standards in combination with cooperative resolution to most
issues.
Just as the troubles of the late 1980s and early 1990s caused a retraction in the
amount of money spent on social programming, they also negatively affected Swedish
commitments to labor market policies. Despite the cutbacks the economic crisis of the
1990s forced in Sweden, it maintained relatively generous unemployment programs, even
if the commitment to total wage equality faded away.83 While there is and will continue
to be large-scale debate about the efficacy of the Swedish welfare state, especially in
relationship to its performance in recent decades, there is no doubt that Sweden sought
and obtained its lofty goals of income inequality throughout the greater part of the
twentieth century. One thing is for sure, Sweden’s ambitious social welfare policy created
a society that was much more willing to accept daily regulation of the workplace by the
federal government than the societies that emerged in the United States and Canada
during the same period.
Conclusion
Despite the disparate histories of the development of the welfare states in the
United States, Canada and Sweden, all three countries have a history of responding to an
economic and cultural crisis by institutionalizing methods of support for the average
workingperson. The generosity and continuity of this support often varied with specific
historical circumstance, exact issue and of course culture. Assessing whether or not there
was something about each country’s culture that predetermined the outcome of these
historical processes or whether the historical processes determined the cultural context of
welfare state development is a difficult if not impossible task. Fortunately for this study,
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the exact relationship between these two processes is less important than the
understanding thattogether they played a large role in producing the present-day realities
of the welfare state in all three countries. Only such an acknowledgement allows a full
understanding of the mechanisms by which existing occupational safety and health
systems operate and most importantly what changes are possible within the current
institutional and cultural context.
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Chapter 2: Regulatory Schemes
The first major choice that a country faces in constructing a workplace safety and
health regime is the extent and form of regulation and enforcement by a government
agency. The scope of the agency’s mandate has important consequences for individual
workplace environments. Often the authority that is vested in a regulatory agency trades
off with the propensity for disputes to be resolved where they occur. Instead, a culture of
dependence that focuses on external actors to resolve workplace disputes can develop as
a result of the authority of the agency. On the other hand, without strong regulatory
enforcement it is difficult to guarantee, with any certainty, that the standards set forth in
legislation are subsequently are followed.
These choices blend into the discussion of other aspects of occupational safety
and health and enforcement. For example, safety committees, groups of workers at
particular plants responsible for maintaining safe working conditions, are deferred to in
safety and health systems that favor a less intrusive regulatory scheme. Balancing the
potential for dependency with the necessity of guaranteed enforcement is a critical part of
creating a successful regulatory structure for a country’s occupational safety and health
system. The specific choices made in balancing these competing concerns often directly
reflect the historical development of the welfare state in each country. In any event, the
choices surrounding the structure of the main safety and health regulatory agency in each
country provide the building block for the entire safety and health enforcement system in
each country. This section will examine the structure of each country’s regulatory
agencies and then investigate the success of each agency in regulating safety and health
conditions in the workplace.
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United States
The regulatory structure of the United States clearly reflects the nation’s post New
Deal focus on minimal labor market intervention. In the United States, the Occupational
Safety and Health Act gives the Secretary of Labor and hence the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) the primary responsibility of enforcing safety and
health regulations. The Act itself provides some workplace standards as well as giving
OSHA the power to create its own standards subject to certain restrictions. The OSH Act
gives the Secretary of Labor the authority to promulgate and enforce occupational safety
and health standards while it gives the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission (OSHRC) the ability to review the Secretary’s standards when protested by
individual employers.84 Thus, where the Act itself does not create safety and health
standards in every workplace area, it does attempt to guarantee the fairness of any
standards by mandating a structural review process of the Secretary of Labor’s decisions
with respect to workplace standards. While in general a typical regulatory agency, OSHA
does diverge from the norm in its division of rulemaking and enforcement authority from
its adjudicative functions.
The Act also guarantees enforcement of these standards through random
inspections of workplaces along with targeted inspections in exceptional cases. In cases
where an employee at a workplace calls for an inspection the Act prohibits retaliation
against the employee on behalf of the employer. Cases of retaliation along with other
violations of the Act are subject to monetary penalties. The centralization of authority in
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the hands of OSHA is a clear choice on behalf of the United States to attempt to primarily
control the workplace environment through governmental instruments.
In order for the previously stated lofty purpose of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act to be met, a strategy that primarily relies on a regulatory agency for
enforcement requires OSHA to be extremely efficient and well-managed. Unfortunately
this strategy often fails and, as is the case with a large variety of legislation, the statutory
intent and provisions of the Act do not necessarily correspond directly with the day-today reality in the workplace.85 One of the most basic reasons for this is the failure of
Congress to back-up its ambitious enforcement regime with adequate funding:
“enforcement is ineffective because there are only about four thousand OSHA
Compliance Officers to inspect and ensure the safety of 92 million employees in
approximately 6 million workplaces”.86 These budgetary shortfalls that existed in the
early 1990s were only compounded by President Clinton’s 1995 Regulatory Reinvention
Initiative. Clinton demanded that OSHA reduce bureaucracy and create partnerships with
private enterprises.87 In the end, these regulatory changes were only attempts by the
Clinton administration to pacify the 104th Congress who wanted “to limit [OSHA’s]
regulatory power and reduce its impact on the private sector”.88 These reductions in
budgetary commitments have had a significant effect on the ability of OSHA and its
inspectors to do their job.89 It is clear that the resulting reduction in odds of inspection
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must reduce the force of the deterrent against safety and health violations that the Act is
supposed to create.
Furthermore, perhaps as a result of the overall inability to police each workplace,
instead of sanctioning employers when there are workplace violations, the goal of
inspectors has been to have employers comply with regulations without having to
penalize them.90 This reluctance to issue violations further diminishes any deterrent effect
by giving employers an almost guaranteed way out of any violation if by chance they are
caught. The one potential recourse employees have in this highly centralized system is to
trigger inspections by issuing complaints. However, despite the Act’s prohibition of
employer retaliation against employees for filing a complaint with OSHA, employees are
reluctant to act for fear of employer retaliation.91 This hesitation combined with the small
deterrent effect of OSHA inspections significantly undercuts the Act’s intent to provide
all employees safe and healthy conditions of work.
Canada
Although Canada has a decentralized form of regulation, with each province
having different laws, the type and enforcement of workplace standards are relatively
similar throughout the country. In general, each province as well as the federal
government sets certain minimum requirements called the CANOSHA regulations.92 The
regulations set forth by the federal government apply only to employees in federal
jurisdictions, such as federal territories and military bases, while the individual provinces
have exclusive jurisdiction over employees inside each province. Enforcement of these
regulations is ensured byrespective federal and provincial government inspections that
90

Gordon, Supra note 86, at 535.
Id.
92
See Canada Occupational Safety and Health Regulations, 120 C. Gaz. 1105 (March 13, 1986).
91

29
are generally random but often targeted as a result of a complaint by a safety committee
or an employee’s refusal to work. The Canadian approach to safety and health, which
combines decentralized authority with minimum standards, creates the need for strong
enforcement while relying on workplace committees to aid the mechanisms of
enforcement.
Although the overall Canadian regulatory scheme resembles that of the United
States, the differences in legislative approaches have important consequences for the
practical enforcement of workplace standards. First, the federal and provincial
governments in Canada have committed more financial resources toward enforcement
and hence the chance of inspection is higher than in the United States. However, similarly
to the United States, inspectors prefer to let individual workplaces resolve any violations
and do not rely heavily on punishment for violations: “The predominant view in
government has been that inspectors should only intervene when they are satisfied that a
joint committee cannot resolve the matter”.93 These joint-committees, whose structure
will be discussed in the next chapter, are thus integral actors in the enforcement drama.
This critical aspect of the Canadian health and safety system exhibits the hands-off
approach of Canadian inspectors in trying to convince the employer to comply with
regulations; they encourage safety committees and employers to reach mutual
agreement.94 This, along with the ability of safety committees to call for an inspection
facilitates strong decentralization in the authority to regulate the workplace and
ultimately aides the government in enforcing workplace standards.
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Sweden
Although the overall Swedish approach to occupational safety and health diverges
significantly from the United States and Canada, the country’s regulatory scheme is
actually very similar in structure to that of the other two counties. The Work
Environment Act of 1977 sets a broad framework for regulation, which divides
responsibilities for workplace safety and health in general terms. The legislation itself,
along with the agency it authorizes, creates broad health and safety standards. However,
instead of specifying a laundry list of punishments for potential violations, the Act
encourages mutual resolution between employers and employees. The Work
Environment Act of 1977 was tightened in 1991 to increase employer responsibility and
to expand the areas covered under the act to include more work processes and more types
of workers disabilities.95 In this way, the Swedish approach continues to emphasize the
enforcement of a large set of necessary health and safety standards while using
cooperative methods of resolution wherever possible.
Although Sweden’s legislative approach to workplace safety and health regulation
is not too different from that of the United States and Canada, the Swedish legislation is
even more effective. Sweden has made a stronger commitment than either of the other
two countries to fulfilling the mandates set forth in the Work Environment Act. The
Swedish Work Environment Authority (SWEA) has over 750 employees in its central
offices, over 400 inspectors in each regional office, and conducts at least 33,000
inspections of 260,000 workplaces each year.96 Additionally, more than 45% of
inspections result in written citations for improvement, and thus only 20 cases a year

95
96

Fact Sheets on Sweden: Occupational Safety and Health, Supra note 69, at 1.
Id. at 2.

31
result in any court appearances.97 SWEA is committed to doing everything possible to
facilitate the safest workplaces possible. For example, the Swedish Inspectorate is
constantly trying to improve its workplace coverage: “The public prosecutor and the
Health and Safety Inspectorate have joined forces to combat breaches of Sweden’s health
and safety legislation … The new joint approach incorporates special case officers in the
police force and the public prosecutor’s service and introduces a more flexible work
method”.98 Of course, solutions like this are only complementary to the greater rate of
funding and respect the enforcement agency receives from the Swedish legislature.
However, after the initial passage of the Work Environment Act in 1970, Swedish
inspectors’ desire to avoid conflict in the workplace as part of an overall system of
industrial peace caused them to employ some of the same hands-off policies as utilized in
the United States and Canada. Fortunately, in Sweden’s constant attempt to adapt its
enforcement mechanism it has begun to utilize more forceful measures:
Inspectors also have the power to issues a written order to correct a violation …
such orders in the past were issued only rarely. In practice, Swedish inspectors
usually gave verbal instructions … without resorting to any legally binding formal
enforcement mechanism. However, a shift is taking place with the inspectorate
becoming increasingly willing to use coercive measures when it identifies
troublesome workplaces. These measures include the use of injunctions or
prohibitions in order to achieve necessary modifications to the work environment.
Significantly, the percentage of inspections leading to issuing of improvement
orders has increased appreciably, due partly to improved procedures for
prioritization and selection of inspection projects.99

97

Id.
Co-operation to Stop Violations of the Work Environment Act, Worklife Jan. 12, 2001, at
http://www.prevent.se/english/artiklar/1396.shtml.
99
Work, Health and Safety: Industry Commission Inquiry Report 223 (Sept. 1995), available at
http://www.pc.gov.au/ic/inquiry/47workhe/finalreport/index.html.
98

32
A unique and innovative approach to selection along with a willingness to issue penalties
when necessary underpins Sweden’s comparative success in enforcing its health and
safety legislation.
Conclusion
While in some ways a discussion of the regulatory component of the occupational
safety and health systems and the corresponding realities in these three countries does not
reveal a great deal about the effectiveness of each enforcement regime, it does point
toward the important elements of each country’s overall enforcement. In the United
States, for example, the primacy of the regulatory agency in enforcing safety and health
violations creates very little room for other elements of the United States’ system to aid
in enforcement. On the other hand, the decentralization of the Canadian approach
combined with the deferral of much of enforcement policy to the workplace means that
additional knowledge of the workplace committee structure in Canada is necessary before
judging the Canadian system’s effectiveness. Sweden’s strong regulatory enforcement,
however, sets the stage for an important exploration of how such an agency can be
successful in a country that has historically valued participatory decision-making at all
levels of working life. In then end, while an essential building block of any safety and
health enforcement system, agency regulation does not guarantee the success of such a
system.
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Chapter 3: Worker Participation
A system of occupational safety and health cannot be effective if it depends solely
on a set of government standards in combination with government enforcement. The task
is simply too large. In order to be effective, regulations and government enforcement
must be complemented by other mechanisms for policing the workplace. One of the main
ways of achieving this goal is by relying on those with the greatest interest in the day-today conditions of employment: employees. The addition of employees to the regulatory
system takes many forms, anything from the ability to sue employers to direct
participation in standard setting. Along with the choice about enforcement mechanisms,
worker participation also reflects employees’ ability to control their own workplace
environment.
The extent to which employees are able to control the workplace exhibits a
government’s trust and attitude toward workers. A government that relies mostly on a
regulatory agency and vests very little power in employees exhibits a partially
paternalistic attitude towards workers. The desire to avoid paternalism must be balanced
with a desire to guarantee consistent conditions across the country. Even if committees
are allowed by some governments, careful attention must be paid to whether of not the
committees are independent of managerial control. These structural concerns are also
value choices. While the importance of these value choices in general and in safety and
health specifically will be addressed later, it is crucial to acknowledge, even at this
descriptive stage, that these choices are clearly interconnected with the type of structural
choices made. These choices affect both the effectiveness of enforcement and the control
each employee feels over the conditions of the workplace. This section will once again
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describe the current legislation in this area and then match that legislation with
contemporary outcomes.
United States
In the United States, the Occupational Safety and Health Act envisions a minimal
amount of employee involvement in regulating workplace safety and health. The Act
provides workers the right to file a complaint with OSHA and accompany an OSHA
official’s inspection of the workplace. One could argue that this choice just displays
confidence in OSHA’s ability to prevent workplace violations without much employee
involvement. On the other hand, in the context of the limited amount of funding for
OSHA, the choice to involve employees only at the most basic level might also suggest
the government’s mistrust of employee motives. Many have thought that employees
would waste time worrying about the conditions of employment when they could be
working, or possibly raise costs for businesses by requesting unnecessary improvements
in health and safety. When in the early 1990s some legislators attempted to amend OSHA
to require workplace committees, employers opposed the changes because they feared the
possibility of new union organizing100 Occupational Safety and Health reform that
envisions workplace safety and health committees has been more successful at the state
level where a number of states have mandated the existence of such committees.101 While
there have been some moves toward greater worker involvement in occupational safety
and health enforcement, the current system does not envision employees having a major
role to play in enforcing workplace standards.
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These legislative choices, as well as the outcomes of such choices, must be seen
against a backdrop of the failure of labor law and specifically worker representation in
the United States. The relevant labor laws and the unions that work under them have
failed to allow for effective representation of workers at almost every level of the national
polity: “There is a large ‘representation gap’ between the desire for and the supply of
collective representation in workplace governance. The labor laws have failed to deliver
an effective mechanism of workplace representation, and have become nearly irrelevant,
to the vast majority of private sector American workers”.102 This failure has not been a
result of worker’s ambivalence to such representation. In particular, workers do want to
participate in determining their workplace safety and health situations. To evidence this
desire, Richard Freeman and Joes Rodgers’ survey of workers in What Workers Want
finds that eighty-five percent of workers felt that workplace committees would be a good
way to enforce occupational safety and health standards.103 The inability of unions and
federal labor law to meet workers’ demands to be represented in relation to safety and
health concerns have marginalized worker participation in determining the day-to-day
conditions of work they face.
Despite the minor role given to employees in regulating the workplace, the right
to file a complaint and accompany an inspection provides some check against egregious
violations of safety and health standards. Unfortunately, even these rights have proved
seemingly ineffective. First, in many workplaces there is no posted information about the
rights of employees under the Act. Also, it is common practice to exclude employees
from OSHA inspections. Even when a complaint is issued by an employee, the settlement
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of the issue rarely involves the employee and is normally negotiated by the inspector and
the employer.104 Finally, although employees have the right to file complaints with
OSH
A, they rarely exercise this right as a result of lack of information and threats of
employer reprisal.105 Once again, some argue that the lack of employee involvement in
regulation is a result of effective enforcement on the behalf of OSHA. However, after
examining the number of workplace injuries and deaths along with the small odds of
inspection, it is clear that in losing out on their ability to participate in enforcement,
workers are losing out on their opportunity to improve the conditions of their workplace.
In lieu of direct workplace representation, there is one other potential avenue for
employee participation in the occupational safety and health enforcement process. This
participation comes under section 11(c) of OSHA which protects whistleblowers.106 The
term whistleblower “is derived from the act of an English bobby blowing his whistle
upon becoming aware of the commission of a crime”.107 In the context of occupational
safety and health enforcement, “a whistleblower is a worker who finds evidence of a
serious violation of law on the part of the employer or its agents, and who takes specific,
active steps to bring that violation to the attention of authorities”.108 Even though most
people believe that whistleblowers deserve protection, there is the possibility that such
protection can be abused as an illegitimate cover for individuals that deserve to be fired
for other, justifiable reasons. While a more sustained analysis of the status of specific
judicial remedies in whistle blowing cases in not possible here, whistleblowers have been
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remarkably successful in winning court cases related to occupational safety and health.109
However, even though protection of whistleblowers does provide some hope for workers’
participation in safety and health enforcement, the limited scope of protections against
the termination of whistleblowers by employers, and the meager court resources and time
available to address this issue temper any hope that such protection provides a panacea
for worker participation.
Aside from the individual participation allowed under the federal system of
occupational safety and health, thirteen states do mandate the existence of workplace
safety committees.110 In these states, committees at unionized workplaces that tend to be
independent of managerial control and thus much more successful in promoting worker
interests than those at non-unionized workplaces.111 Unfortunately, employer fears that
unions might use workplace safety and health committees as platforms for further
workplace organizing in the workplace, have prevented most states from adopting and/or
implementing workplace committee requirements in unionized workplaces.112
Furthermore, even when committees exist in unionized workplaces they are given only an
advisory capacity in all but three states.113 This failure represents the overall refusal of
the safety and health enforcement system in the United States to allow workers to
participate in determining conditions of work. Instead, the only widely available avenues
for workers to participate in safety and health enforcement come in the form often
ineffective and always personally riskyindividual legal action.
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Canada
In contrast to the United States, Canada relies heavily on employees to participate
in the regulation of safety and health in the workplace. This part of the Canadian
occupational safety and health system began during the 1950s and 1960s in the unionized
mining industry, where joint committees were required by collective bargaining
agreements and given the power to enforce health and safety standards.114 As the system
has become institutionalized across Canada’s provinces, a number of common provisions
have been established. First, all enterprises with twenty or more employees must have a
safety committee of at least two people. At least half of the members of a safety
committee must be non-managerial employees. Safety committees are responsible for a
series of tasks that promote accommodation of safety and health standards including:
making recommendations to employers, providing employees with information,
establishing training programs, inspecting facilities each month and keeping records of
safety and health related injuries. Despite this wide range of duties, the safety committee
has only an advisory role and cannot force an employer to implement its
recommendations. Only if an employer and committee fail to reach an agreement on a
safety and health issue only then can government officials be called in to settle the
dispute. However, in some ways these committees do vary by province, with Ontario and
Quebec being the most strongly committed to the role of joint committees.115 Some
variances across provinces include the extent to which committees are mandatory, the

114
115

O’Grady, Supra note 93, at 164.
Watchman, Supra note 110, at 78; See O’Grady, Supra note 93, at 162-197.

39
requirements for a worker to participate on a committee, and the relationship of the
committee to inspectors.116
This two-pronged approach of inspectors and safety committees enhances both
worker participation and enforcement in occupational safety and health practice. With the
ability of an institutionalized force, like safety committees, to oversee the workplace,
inspectors can be alerted to the most pressing safety and health concerns. Also, when
inspectors arrive at a workplace there is already a dialogue between employees and
employers that guarantees worker participation and creates a situation that is much more
amenable to negotiation and resolution. Although it may appear that employees have no
recourse in the event that an employer decides not to implement a safety committee’s
recommendations, in practice safety inspectors generally defer to a safety committee’s
findings.117 Therefore employees are able to participate in determining the conditions of
employment through day-to-day management of the workplace as well as in deciding the
outcome of any violation.
In terms of success in reducing occupational safety and health threats, most
workplaces comply adequately with committee requirements, and empirical evidence
points to the success of workplace committees in reducing injuries and deaths throughout
Canada.118 Importantly, one study found that committees allow Canadian inspectors to
rely on employee participation in the safety and health system in place of inspections.119
Similarly, studies confirm that there are three factors that significantly affect the
performance of safety committees: management support for committees, access to
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information, and committee training.120 While the efficacy of safety committees in
reducing workplace injuries does vary according to the extent that provincial laws ensure
these three factors, safety committees are an important component of the overall safety
and health enforcement regime throughout Canada. In contrast to the United States, the
Canadian system of worker participation does ensure workers a voice in determining their
daily conditions of employment.
Sweden
The Swedish system of worker participation in safety and health issues at the
workplace gives groups of employees at individual workplaces more choice about the
manner in which their workplace is managed than in either the United States or Canada.
The Swedish Work Environment Act of 1977 mandates safety committees at every
workplace with 50 or more employees. In workplaces that have fewer than 50 employees,
the Act mandates some form of representation, even if it is only in the form of a regional
safety and health representative.121 There are about 90,000 total safety and health
delegates, about one quarter of which are replaced yearly. Of these 90,000, 1,500 are
regional representatives whose only job is to represent a group of safety and health
committees in matters that cannot be decided at the individual workplace level.122
The union or majority of employees votes for the employee representatives to the
committee. The size and specific function of each committee is determined by each
workplace. If the committee fails to reach a decision any member of the committee can
refer the case to the government for inspection. The Work Environment Act also
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guarantees employee representatives protection from any discrimination or harassment as
a result of membership in the committee. Worker participation is not merely
complementary to regulatory enforcement. Instead, “measures of worker participation are
fundamental to the ethos of the Swedish legislative approach”.123 Therefore, the Swedish
system places a strong emphasis on the ability of individual workplaces to determine
safety and health standards and management systems.
The application of the protections and privileges that employees have in the
workplace are regularly applied throughout Sweden. Safety committees often participate
in the planning and development of safety programs, organize training, and are even
consulted regarding new plant work and location decisions.124 Some might fear such an
expansive reach for an employee driven organization on account of the possibility of
choosing inefficient systems geared at benefiting employees while cutting profits. The
Swedish experience proves otherwise: “safety committees play an important role in
influencing work conditions, and in general, that authority has been well-utilized”.125 The
result of such intimate contact between employees and employers regarding important
decisions is the ability of inspectors to focus primarily on the most pressing cases without
needing to be concerned with the safety conditions at most workplaces. Since safety
committees provide a sizable check against such violations, safety inspectors are willing
to fine those who violate safety and health standards. Thus, the Swedish system is able to
reinforce norms against safety and health violations by relying on worker participation in
the form of safety committees to help defend against a wide range of possible violations.
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Safety and health committees serve to enhance SWEA’s enforcement of occupational
safety and health standards, while at the same time relying on the Swedish regulatory
agency to conduct necessary random inspections and penalize employers when necessary.
Conclusion
With an understanding of worker participation in occupational safety and health
decisions in the United States, Canada, and Sweden, it is now possible to understand the
full structural mechanism for enforcing occupational safety and health standards in each
country. Worker participation combined with regulatory agency enforcement constitute
the two main components of any safety and health enforcement regime. While in the
United States weak regulatory enforcement is followed by even weaker mechanisms for
worker participation, Sweden and Canada choose to rely more heavily on their workers to
aid in the safety and health enforcement regime. The centralization of the Swedish
regulatory and worker participation schemes, along with the robust support for each go a
long way towards explaining why Sweden has one of the lowest rates of occupational
safety and health fatalities and injuries in the world. While the decentralization of
Canada’s approach makes understanding why it does not achieve such low rates difficult
to determine, a comparison between the Swedish and American experience provides
reasonable evidence that worker participation is not the central problem in Canada. As
much as an evaluation of worker participation and regulatory schemes shows, it does not
yet provide a full understanding of the cultural aspects of occupational safety and health
systems. Understandingculture and its varied relationship to history in contemporary
policy necessitates a further analysis of the right to refuse unsafe work, and finally of the
values associated with specific occupational safety and health policy choices.
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Chapter 4: The Right to Refuse Unsafe Work
The right to refuse unsafe work can have the greatest single effect of any safety
and health provision on an individual worker. It seems obvious that in a situation when an
employee faces imminent death the employee should be allowed to stop working.
However, there are many contentious issues involved in deciding in which cases an
employee has the right to stop working without penalty. Of course, employees do not
want to have to work in situations in which they feel threatened. However, employers are
just as adamant that employees should not be able to stop working without management
approval. Like many other choices in safety and health, this one requires deciding
whether and to what extent power should be decentralized. Whatever actor is given
power over these decisions, be it a particular level of government or a workplace
committee, the main question becomes deciding precisely under which circumstances an
employee should be allowed to refuse unsafe work. It is also critical to decide in what
manner a refusal to work can take places. Disagreement about the relative importance of
management and worker rights gives rise to a situation where employees often believe
they should be able to stop work whenever they want, and many employers believe
employees should be forced to work now and grieve later. Once again, the choices that
each country makes are critically important for the day-to-day conditions of work that
employees face. As in the previous chapters, focusing on particular safety and health
enforcement provisions, this chapter will examine each country with respect to the
legislation and outcomes in the area of the right to refuse unsafe work.
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United States
In the United States, the Occupational Safety and Health Act does not specifically
guarantee employees a right to refuse unsafe work. Instead, it allows employees to file
complaints with OSHA and gives OSHA the subsequent ability to stop work if necessary.
However, in further legislation Congress has given employees the “right to refuse unsafe
work in cases where the employee has a reasonable belief that performance of the work
constitutes imminent danger of death or serious physical injury”.126 Although not central
to this analysis and with parts problems of its own, the National Labor Relations Act does
provide workers the right to refuse unsafe work in situations where the worker is either
covered by a collective bargaining agreement or deemed to be part of protected,
concerted activity.127 In both of these cases the legislation is sufficiently ambiguous and
also relatively explicit in allowing courts to interpret the exact conditions under which an
employee has a right to refuse work. The vague language and deference to OSHA and the
courts in enforcing any right to refuse unsafe work exhibits a legislative approach that
leans toward protecting employer interests at the expense of immediate employee
interests.
Not surprisingly the result of this vague legislation has been to create very few
circumstances in which employees can refuse unsafe work and even fewer circumstances
where they do refuse unsafe work.128 Employees have rarely met the reasonable belief,
immanent danger, and death standard.129 Addition, employees often fear retaliation for

126

See Discrimination Against Employees Exercising Rights under the Williams-Steiger Occupational
Safety & Health Act of 1970, 29 C.F.R. 1977.12(b)(2) (1992).
127
See John B. Flood, Revisiting the Right to Refuse Hazardous Work Amidst the Anthrax Crisis of 2001, 5
U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 545, 562-563 (2003).
128
Id. at 539-540.
129
Id. at 539.

45
exercising their right to refuse unsafe work even though retaliation is prohibited under
OSHA.130 The disappointingly restrictive legislation and subsequent interpretation, along
with the threat of retaliation, create a situation where the small chance of winning a court
case coupled with the large risk of losing pay as a result of challenging the employer
make it almost always undesirable for employees to refuse unsafe work.131
These conclusions have been cemented by a series of court cases. First, in
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, the Supreme Court ruled that OSHA had the right to
regulate employees’ability to refuse unsafe work because the purpose of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act was to protect employees.132 Unfortunately, lower
courts have often refused to enforce specific OSHA mandates in this area. Courts argue
that without direct evidence of prior accidents, the possibility that employees have
another motive in refusing to work along with the possibility that employers will correct
the situation expeditiously diminishes the necessity of protecting the refusal of unsafe
work.133 In this way, the judicial system has failed to uphold the right of individual
employees to immediately refuse unsafe work, and instead has suggested that employees
work first and grieve later.
While not necessarily a testament to legislative effectiveness, arbitration decisions
in the area of safety and health do have an important effect on workers’ ability to refuse
work in the United States. Private arbitrators, partly because there are few mechanisms
for review of arbitral decisions, almost entirely disregard the presumption in favor of
workers set forth in OSHA
, and instead defer to their own theories about the assumption
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of risk.134 A comprehensive study by Gross and Greenfield reveals that “it is the
employee who must carry the burden of ultimate persuasion by establishing the
sufficiency of his or her reason for refusing the work assignment”.135 This presumption
against employees in arbitration decisions mirrors the presumption set forth in court
decisions interpreting OSHA. Although the intent of the safety and health legislation in
the Untied States was clearly not to create a strong right to refuse unsafe work, it is
difficult to imagine that legislators did not intend to at least provide some basic
protections for workers refusing to do unsafe work.
Canada
In contrast to the United States, the Canadian system of workplace safety and
health favors a significant employee right to refuse unsafe work. Although there are slight
differences across provinces, there is an almost uniform reasonable cause standard for
refusing unsafe work. Once an employee invokes the right to refuse unsafe work, an
employer can take immediate remedial action and fix the problem. If the employee still
refuses to work a government safety officer is called in to inspect the workplace
premises. In most provinces there is explicit protection against employer retaliation even
if the government safety officer finds no reasonable cause or immediate danger.136 The
extensive protection against employer retaliation combined with the right to refuse unsafe
works sets a very strong tone in favor of employees in potentially unsafe work
environments.
These strong legislative commands have been backed up by safety and health
jurisprudence throughout Canada. In determining when an employee can exercise the
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right to refuse unsafe work one court has explicitly stated that objective proof is not
necessary.137 Once the standard of proof does not require an employee to show potential
harm with absolute certainty, it becomes almost entirely up the employee to determine
when conditions warrant a refusal to work. That is, Canadian workers have the ability to
offer justifications for their actions that do not require them to prove beyond any doubt
that the workplace was unsafe, but only that their choice not to work based upon some
reasonable expectation that they were about to perform unsafe work. The Canadian Labor
Relations Board has afforded employees the utmost protection from any form of
retaliation by declaring, “it is not unreasonable to be wrong if one is acting in good faith.
Absent an ulterior motive, absolute protection is afforded”.138 These decisions are of
course not made lightly. The courts have indeed reflected on the possible damage that
allowing such an expansive interpretation of the right to refuse unsafe work might do to
management interests: “We appreciate the Employer’s right to manage the workplace.
However, the employee has an obligation to refuse unsafe work when he believes an
imminent danger exists”.139 These decisions therefore create a positive right for
employees to refuse unsafe work on their own terms and not management’s terms. The
combination of strong legislative language and court interpretations in favor of the right
to refuse unsafe work create a Canadian workplace environment where employees feel
free to stop work when there is immanent danger.
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Sweden
The Swedish Work Environment Act combines the right to refuse unsafe work
with a form of worker participation. The legislation mandates one or more safety
delegates be appointed at all workplaces with five or more employees. The safety
delegates are appointed by the local employee organization. If no such organization
exists, the delegates in adopted by the majority of the employees at the workplace. The
safety delegates are given extensive rights and privileges including training, time off with
pay, protection from discrimination, and, most importantly, the right to stop hazardous
work. As a result, it is the safety delegate’s responsibility to monitor working conditions
and to act to remedy unhealthy situations whenever possible. In providing employees
with a strong institutionalized figure to oversee safety and health conditions and stop
work when necessary, the Swedish system takes some the pressure off individual
employees in refusing unsafe work.
Some worry that a system which relies on safety delegates to stop unsafe work
threatens management’s ability to run an efficient workplace. However, the results have
shown that safety delegates use their privileges only when necessary and rarely abuse the
right to stop work.140 Specifically, in 1979 the peak in number of cases of refusal to work
came only one year after the passage of the Act.141 Since then the number of cases filed
has declined dramatically thanks to the joint decision-making process envisioned by the
safety and health representative system: “The right to suspend work was used most
frequently during the first few years after the act took effect ... The decline in number of
cases is probably attributable to joint decisions by both employers and employees to
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suspend work, thereby obviating the need to call in the Labor Inspectorate”.142 Once
again the Swedish experience shows that vesting power in employees or their
representatives does not sabotage management interests. The intent of the Work
Environment Act to create a situation where employees and employers jointly determine
working conditions with minimal government interference is exhibited in the effective
and nonconfrontational use of the right to refuse unsafe work.
Conclusion
While policies guaranteeing the right to refuse unsafe work might seem like a
separate issue from decisions related to regulatory structure and worker participation, in
the end, all three decisions are remarkably interlinked. The failure of the United States to
protect an employee’s right to refuse unsafe work makes sense in the context of system
that centralizes enforcement in the hands of an underfunded regulatory agency and does
not give workers any collective participation in determining their day-to-day working
conditions. On the other, the decisions of Canada and Sweden to provide a strong and
enforceable right to refuse unsafe work parallels both countries’ decisions to give
workers a large amount of power in determining their conditions of work. Besides
corresponding to other elements of the regulatory structure in each country, the decision
to allow an employee to refuse unsafe work displays something important about the
values of each country. For example, the situations in the United States where public and
private judicial bodies are skeptical of the intentions of the employee in a refusal to work
case display a particularly cynical attitude towards workers. As the historical analysis of
the development of the welfare state indicates, this mistrust is pervasive, especially at the
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policymaking level, in the contemporary cultural context of the United States. While this
assertion certainly seems to be true, before decrying the value of choices of United States
policy, one must engage in a critical reflection of the place of values in policy as well as a
specific justification of a set of values from which to view policy choices.
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Conclusion: Workers’ Rights as Human Rights and Policy Recommendations for the
United States
Instead of plunging directly into particular policy recommendations, it is
important to understand the current situation facing anyone demanding change in existing
labor laws. To put it simply, the situation is dire. Existing labor laws and their limited
protections have largely withered away under the power of employer interests: “It will
come as no surprise to anyone with a passing familiarity with labor law that it is old, in
many ways anachronistic, and unusually resistant to change … I know of no other major
legal regime … that has been so insulated from significant change for so long”.143 The
challenge is great and that only makes more evident the need for a renewed cultural
debate about the related issues. Unpopular reforms “can be achieved only through
discourse that seeks to demonstrate that reform is not only necessary, by giving good
reasons for new policy initiatives, but also appropriate, through the appeal to values”.144
In this light, no policy recommendations are likely to be implemented without a vigorous
defense of the values and economic rights that provided the foundation for the initial
expansion of the welfare state in the United States. This section of the paper will begin
with such a defense, followed by specific policy recommendations for the United States’
occupational safety and health enforcement system.
I believe that workers’ rights in general, and in the case of occupational safety and
health in particular, constitute human rights. Although a full discussion of the basis for all
human rights is beyond the scope of this work, it is necessary to develop a coherent
picture of human rights from which workers’ rights in the occupational safety and health

143
144

Estlund, Supra note 36, at 1531.
Schmidt, Supra note 7, at 231.

52
area can be claimed as human rights. Basic conceptions of rights view such rights as
claims upon individuals and/or the state.145 Human rights are said to be universal because
they are derived from the existence of an individual as a human being and are seen as an
end.146 Furthermore, human rights must be enjoyed by all individuals to the same
extent.147 These human rights have traditionally been attached to basic civil and political
liberties, such that an individual is not impeded from obtaining a basic degree of
freedom.148 The basic definition of human rights thus has given rise to a distinction
between positive and negative rights. Negative rights, of which all human rights were
traditionally seen to be, require restraint on the part of some individual or state.149
Positive rights, on the other hand, required an individual or state to perform a particular
duty.150 With this conception of human rights as necessarily negative rights, it was
difficult to see how affirmative guarantees for workers could be fundamental human
rights since they were positive rights.
Fortunately, the argument for viewing workers’ rights as examples of human
rights is convincing. The central argument here is that “economic rights are indeed true
human rights … because they are inherently connected to civil and political rights”.151 To
prove this claim it is taken for granted that civil and political rights are human rights.152
The difficult part of this argument comes in showing that economic rights are in fact
interconnected to civil and political rights. Since economic rights have traditionally been
understood as only positive rights it must be shown that economic rights are necessary to
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the negative rights associated with civil and political freedom.153 To begin with, if a right
is essentially a claim then the claim is at least partly predicated upon the ability of the
agent to make a claim. This means that an individual must also be able to resist being
wrongfully coerced into not being able to choose in a civil and political context.154
In order to link economic rights to civil and political rights, it must be proved that
economic rights are necessary for an individual agent to exercise political and civil
choices without coercion. This can in fact easily be demonstrated by reflecting on the
importance of economic needs. As human agents have permanent, basic economic needs
such as the requirement for adequate food, shelter and clothing, economic needs must
have attached economic rights.155 This assertion is bolstered by an individual’s need for a
certain minimum amount of personal security to survive each day.156 Therefore, without
an individual’s basic economic rights an individual will not have the minimum amount of
personal security necessary to exercise any political or civil freedoms without coercion.
That is, bereft of even the basic requirement of food, shelter and clothing, individuals
cannot be expected to resist even the most meager economic inducement to relinquish
their political and civil human rights.
Some will argue that economic rights in fact have nothing to do with freedom.
However, that is just semantics: “It is not a freedom to do anything, or for anything.
Rather it is a freedom from being coerced into doing things”.157 Furthermore, states often
take away some measure of freedom in order to enforce basic welfare rights by codifying
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laws that limit freedom.158 Therefore, freedom by itself is not a right, but only when it is
connected with some civil or political good. Also, a right can only exist if there is not a
strong economic disincentive against invoking it. Even if a right were codified through
legislation, if invoking that right would be too economically costly for an average person
then it would not be guaranteed in any important way.159 Finally, safety and health
concerns are an important example of economic rights. Human safety and health, as
protected at the workplace, are intimately associated with the expression of fundamental
human rights:
Given that the major determinants of health status are societal in nature, it seems
evident that only a framework that expresses fundamental values in societal terms,
and a vocabulary of values that links directly with societal structure and function,
can be useful to the work of public health. For this reason, modern human rights
… seeking to articulate the societal level preconditions for human well-being,
seems a … useful framework.160
That is, human health is harmed without basic personal security in the workplace.
Understanding the relationship between individual and social choice is one of the
further difficulties in describing any account of human rights. In deciding what kind of
rights a state should guarantee individual citizens, it is not just a question of what each
individual desires, but rather it is a question of understanding what kind of rights and
risks are appropriate for society in general: “Individual choice is the domain of
rationality, whereas social choice is the domain of reasonableness”.161 Along these lines,
some might say that occupational safety and health related injuries are randomly
distributed, and that it is luck that determines which individuals are negatively affected.
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Ignoring the fact that these outcomes are often not randomly distributed, they still
constitute an injustice because “the difference between misfortune and injustice
frequently involves our willingness and or capacity to act or not to act on behalf of the
victims”.162 These social choices in favor of a safe and healthy work environment must
also be enforced in order for a state to fulfill its duty.163 Once the responsibility for
guaranteeing the human rights embodied in a safe and healthy workplace is understood as
primarily social, it becomes clear that welfare state policies must definitively outline
these rights while providing effective means for their enforcement.
Against such a line of thought, many argue that the economic costs of effective
enforcement outweigh any benefits accrued from such protection. Initially, this claim is
belied by an understanding of economic rights as inalienable human rights. Beyond this
basic skepticism, dealing with economic cost arguments requires separating claims that
occupational safety and health enforcement costs workers economically from the claim
that enforcement costs employers too much. The most plausible of all of these economic
cost arguments is that without dangerous jobs, workers would be forced to take lesser
jobs or no jobs at all. The first economic problem with this argument is that the workers
who take these risks are clearly paid less than executives who take no health risks on a
daily basis: “the pool of labor for many hazardous jobs consists of poorly educated and
low-skilled workers who accept the risks for low pay”.164 Also, this economic analysis
creates a false choice for workers where they clearly have no choice. Although it is true
that workers could in theory quit unsafe jobs at any time, in a practical situation where
the only alternative is for their families to starve, the option of quitting cannot seriously
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be considered: “even if they do have that knowledge, given the extremely desperate
circumstances most of them find themselves in, it probably would not affect their
practices all that much … the more general economic and social conditions of these
workers are contribution factors to outcomes”.165 Finally, this economic perspective
assumes a form of perfect information that simply does not exist. Poorly educated
workers are often not given adequate information about the risks associated with their
jobs, and, even if they were, no human being could be expected to mathematically
compare serious injury to an hourly wage. In this way, economic arguments about job
availability emanate from flawed economic assumptions.
These arguments, however, also betray a value choice that degrades human beings
to mere resources capable of efficient management by the higher power of the employer.
This view ignores the severity of a situation where there are “10,000 traumatic deaths a
year and tens of thousands of traumatic injuries”.166 Certainly no member of society
would choose to allow a loved one to be subjected to such a horrific situation. Reducing
individuals to part of an efficiency equation where human life can be compared to wages
cannot easily be separated from forms of human bondage. The only clear divide is the
supposed choice workers have over their employment.
The company cost argument proposes an even more egregious violation of any
framework of economic rights. Unfortunately it is argument that has been most
persuasive in contemporary America is the company cost argument. This argument relies
on traditional cost-benefit analysis and economic theories about Pareto optimality, under
which a company should produce its goods in the most efficient way possible. This form
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of cost-benefits analysis ignores any concept of fairness. First, injuries in the workplace
are devastating and cannot be undone. This means that fairness must be maintained “at
the time the risk is imposed, not after it issues the injury”.167 Also, because of the
irreparable nature of these injuries, the harm incurred cannot be compared to normal
benefits. Thus, cost-benefit analysis incorrectly equates a large number of trivial losses
for a group of people to one devastating loss for a single individual.168 That is, an
individual’s health is essential to human agency whereas the small amount of financial
benefits attributable to each individual in a large group is not.169 This reply does not even
imply the full rights analysis from above; rather, fairness is a consideration about how a
given a set of costs and benefits should be weighed, and does not have to exclude any
accounting for economic costs like a strict rights analysis might.
Additionally, because of the social choice issue here it is impossible to rationalize
costs as merely a fact of life. Instead, social choice necessitates a reasonableness that
does not allow society to doom its individual members.170 In response to this point about
social choice and responsibility, it can be argued that society cannot be responsible for
every risk an individual faces each day. This focus on background risk ignores the unfair
dispersion of such risk along with the tremendous significance of an occupational safety
and health accident for an individual.171 Furthermore, a cost-benefit analysis cannot
adjudicate this conflict because its attempt to attribute a dollar figure to human life is not
only offensive but impossible.172 In the end, all of these cost-benefit based arguments fail
167

Keating, Supra note 161, at 660.
See Id. at 660-661.
169
Id. at 676.
170
Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 119, 136 (2003); See
Keating, Supra note 161, at 677-678
171
Keating Supra note 161, at 701.
172
Babich, Supra note 170, at 155-156; Granatstein, Supra note 38, at 423.
168

58
because “it is evident when we can alleviate suffering, whatever its cause, it is passively
unjust to stand by and do nothing. It is not the origin of the injury, but the possibility of
preventing and reducing its costs, that allows us to judge whether there was or was not
unjustifiable passivity in the face of disaster”.173 The shift in focus from economic
considerations revolving primarily around cost to revolving primarily around rights and
concurrent considerations of justice, places an emphasis on understanding the values
embraced by each welfare state in making occupational safety and health policy.
The individual policy choices made by each welfare state come in the larger
context of international human rights law. Until recently even the most liberal human
rights organizations have not taken economic rights nearly as seriously as more
traditional human rights.174 Despite this, workers’ rights have long been recognized as
human rights in the international sphere. Both the 1948 United Nations’ Declaration of
Human Rights and the 1992 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to
which the United is a party, recognize the interdependence of economic and political
rights.175 However, an international consensus on what specific economic rights were
human rights was not formalized until the International Labor Organization (ILO)
adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in 1998.
Unfortunately, this document excluded occupational safety and health from the definition
of important workplace human rights. Instead, the ILO’s declaration enumerated four
rights as “core” worker rights: freedom of association and the right to collective
bargaining; elimination of forced or compulsory labor; abolition of child labor; and
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elimination of discrimination in employment.176 This decision to exclude safety and
health from the list of “core” worker rights ignored the vast array of historical documents,
political developments, and comprehensive arguments pointing towards the need to
include safety and health as a fundamental workers’ right.177 The failure of the
international community to codify the right to safety and health as a basic workplace right
creates ample space for the differing policies and attitudes of nations seen in this area.
In terms of occupational safety and health enforcement, the choices by the United
States, Canada and Sweden betray very different value choices. Canada and Sweden, to
varying degrees, do embrace workers rights as human rights. The Canadian system’s
tradition of guaranteeing income security and healthcare to all of its citizens makes it no
surprise that it also upholds human rights in the workplace by allowing workers to
participate in decisions regarding health and safely in the workplace and to refuse unsafe
work in almost all situations. Sweden does even better. With such a strong desire to
guarantee workers’ basic economic rights, Swedish occupational safety and health policy
combines effective regulatory enforcement, strong worker participation in a primarily
union setting, and the right to refuse unsafe work to protect workers’ abilities to exercise
economic as well as civil and political rights at every level.
On the other hand, in the United States, there is almost no desire to be
accountable for economic rights in the workplace or anywhere else. In general,
“international human rights, including labor rights, have made almost no discernable
mark upon American domestic law”.178 What is most disturbing about this is that the
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United States’ official view is that it is a positive model for economic rights throughout
the world.179 It is difficult not to react to such statement with a high degree of cynicism.
The failure of the United States to sufficiently fund an occupational safety and health
enforcement regime, not to mention its lack of workers participation in safety and health
decisions and its failure to provide a right to refuse unsafe work, makes it one of the
worst violators of economic rights in the developed world. These decisions stem
primarily from a value system which favors management control and profit over the
protection of workers rights. The results of an analysis of United States occupational
safety and health enforcement in the context of a robust understanding of economic rights
as human rights are terrifying and render policy recommendations for reform all the more
urgent.
Instead of discarding every aspect of the current safety and health enforcement
regime in the United States, it is useful to evaluate the extent of its failure so that
potential areas of improvement can be found. Some argue that in fact workplace and
injuries and death have declined since OSHA’s creation in 1970. While there is some
initial validity to this statement, any decline in injuries or deaths cannot be attributed to
OSHA because these rates were already declining before its creation: “To credit OSHA
with all of the post-1970 drop in fatalities is similar to a physician’s taking credit for the
health of the patient whom the doctor did not start treating until two years after the
patient began recovering”.180 Instead, the decline in injuries and fatalities came primarily
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from technological change and a move toward more white-collar jobs.181 In fact, “the vast
majority of studies has found no statistically significant reduction in the rate of workplace
fatalities due to OSHA”.182 Given previous statistics describing the appalling injury and
death rates still associated with occupational injury in the Untied States, even if OSHA
had contributed to recent declines, it would still require a drastic overhaul.
The failure of the passage of the 1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act to
significantly reduce the number of workplace injuries and fatalities cannot easily be
blamed on a set of discrete factors. However, individual choices about the type of
enforcement, worker participation, and right to refuse unsafe work certainly contribute to
a system where employees are often left out of decisions affecting the day-to-day
conditions of the workplace. Many will object to any attempt to transfer the successful
approaches of other countries to the United States’ unique cultural and political setting.
While there is certainly some validity to this point, the same claim could be made for
administering national legislation in a federalist system. Empirically, national
occupational safety and health legislation has been successful in countries with divergent
values in different geographical areas.183 Similarly, even though the United States
consists of 50 states, some with very different values, it is not impossible to envision a
coherent national agenda in favor of stronger workplace protections for workers. One
obstacle is the overall divergence in values exhibited in both legislation and outcomes in
the United States, Canada and Sweden. Perhaps reevaluating the potential consequences
of importing different workplace safety and health systems can contribute to an overall
reevaluation of the values that are reflected in individual policy choices.
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At this point, an astute reader will notice that advancing recommendations for the
United States based upon success in Canada seems puzzling given that its rate of injuries
and death as a result of occupational safety and health accidents was much higher than
that same rate in the United States. Importantly, these overall statistics do not disprove
the sustained analysis of particular provisions of enforcement in Canada. Without
accounting for possible reporting differences in the data used, there are a number of
explanations that make the disparity in outcomes and supposed effectiveness makes
sense. First, the Canadian system is decentralized. This means that while robust safety
and health committees in some provinces diminish safety and health accidents, high rates
in other provinces without such systems might offset the potential overall gains.
Specifically, most provinces give committees only advisory roles at the workplace and
thus fall into a similar trap to the United States of relying to heavily on agency
enforcement. Also, while Canada may not reduce the absolute number of injuries or
accidents in the workplace, its promotion of the right to refuse unsafe does display an
important respect for workers rights as human rights. Finally, as even a basic
understanding of statistical methods indicates, these overall statistics are meaningless
without holding other factors constant. For example, it is possible that the expanse of
Canadian territories or the particular industries that dominate Canada might make
limiting occupational accidents more difficult. In any event, without such statistical
analysis proving that the particular factors examined here are actually contributing to the
problems in Canada, it would be foolish to disregard the potential lessons of the specific
successes of these programs for the United States.

63
In the case of enforcement of the standards and regulations created by OSHA it is
clear that something must be changed. The sheer enormity of the task of monitoring all of
the workplaces in the United States with a dearth of staff and funding calls for change.
Both Canada and Sweden have attempted to meet this challenge, and have partially
succeeded by divesting some of the power located in the government to individual
employees or their representatives. These schemes risk allowing potentially unqualified
individuals to control the way safety and health standards are enforced. However, in the
experience of Canada and Sweden, often employees or their representatives serve a
complementary function in directing inspectors to the most urgent cases in need of
inspection while resolving many disputes at individual workplaces. Even without
factoring in enforcement via workplace representatives, European countries have one
inspector for every 10,000 workers whereas in the United States there is one inspector for
every 55,976 workers.184 The decision as to what exact form of employee representation
is needed depends largely on the surrounding labor relations climate. In Canada, like the
United States, there is comparatively less unionization than Sweden, so it is necessary to
have very specific directives for ensuring the institutionalization of cooperation about
safety and health in the workplace. In Sweden, however, the overall climate of
cooperative labor relations lends itself to less specific legislation, which can rely on
preexisting patterns and relationships between labor and management to negotiate any
disputes. In this particular context, that reliance has resulted in stronger protections for
workers as well as reduced workplace accidents.
The promotion of employee control over enforcing and even managing safety and
health systems creates a vital impetus for innovation and change. When employees have a
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greater level of control and protection in exercising that responsibility they are more
likely to report any problems. Based upon experience in the United States with state
required and voluntary safety and health committees (SHCs), Gregory Watchman
concluded that “SHCs can be adapted to a wide range of workplaces and that they reduce
workplace fatalities, injuries, and illnesses. SHSs also improve labor-management
relations by allowing workers and management to work toward a mutual goal and by
offering a more cooperative alterative to OSHA inspections and enforcement”.185
Additionally, experience indicates that such safety and health committees save money,
particularly in states such as Oregon that encourage committees in unionized
workplaces.186 While informative, Watchman’s lone study in this area needs to be
updated and pursued with a more rigorous, perhaps even statistical, analysis. The results
of such sustained comparative analysis between the different programs that already exist
in states or even the different programs that exist in Canadian provinces could well
provide many of the answers to the questions raised by this paper.
But perhaps of greater importance, when employees feel they are being taken
seriously on issues that so directly impacts their lives, they are more likely to voice their
opinions on safety and health systems in the workplace. This type of dialogue on an issue
as important to the day-to-day conditions of work as safety and health has the potential to
open up dialogue on other issues. In the United States, more often than not, employees
feel like they are in an adversarial relationship with their employers, partially because
whenever they feel they are being mistreated, their statutory recourse is always to a
regulatory agency and subsequently litigation. Although, an employee who attempts to
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engage an employer with a set of recommendations for change will not always succeed,
the added force of government legislation and inspectors requiring the employer to at
least listen gives the employee the protection from employer reprisals while possibly
opening up channels of communication. The difference between an approach that values
employees and their right to determine their conditions of work, and one that centralizes
power in the hands of the government and employers, is most clearly shown in the right
to refuse unsafe work.
Instead of giving employees the right to refuse unsafe work with full protection,
the United States has virtually condoned unsafe conditions by forcing employees to work
in dangerous situations and perhaps complain about it afterwards. This focus on the
courts as a means of adjudicating the claims of individual employees after the fact gives
employees no protection when they need it most. A decision like this reflects so little
trust in employees and their ability to determine what constitutes unsafe conditions that it
seems the government would rather have employees die than have a few employees stop
work unnecessarily. Based upon the results in Canada and Sweden, it is obvious that
employees take their ability to refuse work seriously and rarely misuse the authority.
Given the deference many people in authority and otherwise enjoy when any life is at
stake, it is a wonder that when an individual employees feel their life is threatened they
are punished for acting in self-defense and refusing to work.
Given this discussion, it is clear that the United States needs to add an element of
worker participation to its occupational safety and health enforcement system. Instead of
attempting to immediately mandate workplace committees at all locations throughout the
United States, Congress would be well suited to view programs like those in Oregon as
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pilot programs that are worthy of expansion. Such expansion could take place through
federal financial incentives for state occupational safety and health programs that
increase worker participation. Optimally, Congress would simultaneously begin to
require safety and health committees in workplaces with the most workplace safety and
health problems. Industries such as auto, mining and steel would serve as excellent
starting points because of their tradition of collective bargaining and worker organization.
The issue of the right to refuse work could then be negotiated at a workplace level before
it was brought to national attention. As a result of these processes, the extent to which the
United States mirrors Canada and Sweden in both the effectiveness and desire for
workplace committees would become clear. With that information, Congress could
expand, alter, scale-back or eliminate these programs.
With all of the discussion about worker participation and worker involvement at
the workplace, some will surely point to modern forms of human resource management
and/or unionization as means of increasing such participation and involvement. While
astute, these suggestions ignore the fundamental bases of the argument advanced here. It
is precisely the fact that employer driven human resource management and employee
supported unions have not provided meaningful protection and participation at work that
intervention is required. Even if unions were willing to provide such participation and
protection, the current levels of unionization would render such change relatively
meaningless. Additionally, on the whole unions have shown no signs of changing
themselves from organizations primarily concerned with wages and benefits to
organizations primarily concerned with human rights such as the right to safety and
health. As for human resource management, even an individual with a casual interest in
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labor history will acknowledge that a healthy dose of skepticism is due any employer
driven program claiming to promote meaningful participation and protection for workers.
Furthermore, the entire previous discussion indicates that it is the large structures and
corresponding cultural orientation that seem to determine the depth and breadth of worker
participation and protection in the workplace. That is, without a structural commitment to
the goal of worker participation, employers in the United States have shown no desire to
provide meaningful worker participation or protection. Finally, if the arguments advanced
about worker’s rights as human rights are taken seriously, then workplace safety and
health considerations cannot be left up to employers’ whims but must be secured by
effective government enforcement coupled with meaningful worker participation.
The United States has long had a labor relations culture that does not favor
placing power in the hands of employees but prefers to centralize it in the hands of the
government and its emissaries. This approach is often debated and certainly has its merits
in some situations. However, in a situation like workplace safety and health where
enforcement is underfunded and enforcement so closely impacts the day- to-day lives of
individual employees, the system seems fatally flawed. Perhaps importing the exact
methods of other countries such as Canada and Sweden is not the answer. However, an
eye to those countries does reveal that the policy choices made by governments do matter
for individual employees and their workplace conditions. Each decision has the power to
begin to change the way employees are perceived and build bridges that other countries
have used to further the success of many of their labor relations policies.

